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RECENT DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS

Motion Picture Censorship
"Civil liberties" is a sensitive phrase, for
it suggests the sacred, and the sacred bears
vehement defense. So it is that the familiar
history of civil liberties in this country presents an immense and continuing journal
embodying in every chapter man's most
heartfelt argument. Judicially, civil rights
controversies have inspired decisions most
positive and lucid, yet to each is attached
an opinion of clear dissent, sometimes
angry, usually indignant, and always vigorous. In Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,1 the United States Supreme Court
upholds this tradition in full measure.
Petitioner, owner of exclusive rights in
the motion picture "Don Juan," appealed
from a refusal of the City of Chicago to
issue a license authorizing the film's exhibition in that city. The refusal was based
on a city ordinance 2 providing that all films
be so licensed and that "such permit shall
be granted only after the motion picture
film for which said permit is requested has
been produced at the office of the commissioner of police for examination or censorship ....
. The petitioner applied for a
permit but declined to submit the film for
review. His application, consequently, was
denied.
Upon certiorari, petitioner urged that
since the ordinance required censorship
1 29 U.S.L.

WEEK 4120 (U.S. Jan. 24,
2 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE §

1961).

155-4, cited
in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 29 U.S.L.
WEEK 4120 (U.S. Jan. 24,'1961).
3 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

before any motion picture may legally be
displayed, it constitutes a previous restraint
on freedom of speech and therefore is, on
its face, violative of the first and fourteenth
amendments. It is well that emphasis be
placed on the fact that the ordinance is
challenged on the ground, and on the sole
ground, that it establishes a scheme of
censorship involving.prior restraint. Understood in this perspective, the issue becomes
an extremely narrow one. In effect, the
petitioner requested that the court hold all
prior restraints on free speech to be void
per se. 4 The Court declined so to do.
While recognizing that the motion picture industry is entitled to the constitutional
protections against pre-censorship, 5 the
Court refused to hold such protection to be
entirely unlimited. Primary reliance is
placed on the remarks of Chief Justice
Hughes in Near v. Minnesota,6 a case of
signal importance in the area. There, the
Supreme Court struck down a Minnesota
statute authorizing injunctive relief against
"malicious, scandalous and defamatory"
newspapers. 7 While asserting every man's
undoubted right to "lay what sentiments
he pleases before the public," s the Court
4 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, supra note

1, at 4121. The issue in the Court's words was
"whether the ambit of constitutional protection
includes complete and absolute freedom to exhibit,
at least once, any and every kind of motion
picture." Ibid.
5 This, inter alia, was the holding in Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
6283 U.S. 697 (1931).
7 Id. at 702.
8 Id. at 714.
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in Near was careful, at the same time, to
leave ample room for exceptions. Speaking
of previous restraints, it said:
[Tihe protection . . . is not absolutely
unlimited. But the limitation has been
recognized only in exceptional cases ...
No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its
recruiting service or the publication of the
sailing dates of transports or the number
and location of troops. On similar grounds,
the primary requirements of decency may
be enforced against obscene publications.

The security of the community life may be
protected against incitements to acts of
violence and the overthrow by force of
orderly government.9
This and similarly worded dicta in subsequent cases10 precluded, in the Court's
opinion, a holding that would render the
freedom of speech and press immune from
all previous censorship.
The Court was not asked to assess the
validity of the tests by which the Chicago
Police Commissioner was to judge the films
reviewed, nor was any indication of the
content of the motion picture in question
presented on the record. Rather, the Court
decided merely that previous restraint is
not, in itself, a circumstance fatal to the
city's ordinance.
Four justices dissented. Chief Justice
9 Id. at 716 (emphasis added)

(footnotes by the
Court omitted).
10 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957): "In the light of ... history, it is apparent
that the unconditional phrasing of the First
Amendment was not intended to protect every
utterance. . . . [T]here is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was
outside the protection intended for speech and
press." Id. at 483. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952): "It does not follow that
the Constitution requires absolute freedom to
exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all
times and all places." Id. at 502.

Warren used more than eight thousand
words to articulate an indignant minority
view. The major point of departure between the minority and prevailing opinions
seems to be a dispute as to the issue presented.
The majority answered, in the negative,
the question "whether the ambit of constitutional protection includes complete and
absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once,
any and every kind of motion picture.""
But to the dissent "this case clearly . . .
[presents] the question of our approval of
unlimited censorship of motion pictures before exhibition through a system of administrative licensing."'1 2 One faction asks
"may any films be censored," and the other
asks, "may all films be censored without
limitation." A broad discrepancy is patent.
Because Times Film ought make its impression only upon the issue selected, delimited and decided by the majority, this
discussion will be similarly narrowed.
Despite the disparity between basic issues,
at least two of the objections offered by the
Chief Justice are in direct conflict with the
majority view.
The first of these is that while prior
restraint as a constitutional bar does have
exceptions, these exceptions were never
thought to include censorship of motion
pictures. 13 Attention is directed to Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 14 wherein it was held
that injunctive restraints against disseminators of pornographic literature are not in
violation of the first and fourteenth amendments, provided it is demonstrated that
such injunction will issue only after initial
11Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 29
U.S.L. WEEK 4120 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1961).
12 Id. at 4124 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 4125 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
14 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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distribution. In such an event the injunction assumes a form similar in nature and
effect to -criminal proceedings.'5 Dicta in
Kingsley characterized freedom from prior
restraint as a right limited only by exceptional circumstances, but further indicated
that such circumstances are "to be closely
confined so as to preclude what may fairly
be deemed licensing or censorship."' 6
Under the view thus expressed, it would
seem clear that prior restraint for the purpose of censorship is constitutionally to be
condemned. However, dictum by Chief
Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota includes equally clear sentiments to the contrary. 17 The Court therefore merely chose
its position from conflicting dicta. Its decision gives official recognition to censorship as a possible area of justifiable prior
restraint. This is all that the question, as
framed by the majority, required.
The second dissenting objection penetrates more deeply. It is addressed to the
strictly administrative form of the censorship system created by Chicago's statute.
The censor is beholden to those who sponsored the creation of his office. . . .His
function is to restrict and restrain; his decisions are insulated from the pressures that
might be brought to bear by public sentiment if the public were given an opportunity
to see that which the censor has curbed.

The censor performs free from all of the
procedural safeguards afforded litigants in
a court of law. . . . The likelihood of a fair
and impartial trial disappears when the
censor is both prosecutor and judge. There
is a complete absence of rules of evidence. . . . How different from a judicial
proceeding where a full case is presented
-by the litigants. The inexistence of a jury
to determine contemporary community
standards is a vital flaw. 18
Lending support to this objection is the
fact that under the challenged ordinance,
film distributors are given no opportunity
whatever to defend or justify the contents
of a motion picture.19 Statutes affecting civil
liberties have been voided for constitutional
20
transgressions far softer than this.
In the strictest sense, however, this line
of argument falls wide of the issue to which
the majority limits itself. The objection
necessarily involves investigation and consideration of the operation of the ordinance
and its consequent abridgment of free
speech. These ordinarily are highly relevant circumstances. 2 But the Court's decision in Times Film involved only a
consideration of the alleged per se invalid'8 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, supra

note 11,

t 4130 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).

19 Id. at 4129 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
20 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147

(1939)

(permit to distribute literature to issue

only upon judgment of police officer that appli15 Id. at 443.
ld. at 441.
17 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). List-

ing several possible exceptions to the right against
freedom from prior restraint, the Court declared:
"[T]he primary requirements of decency may
be enforced against obscene publications." Id.
at 716. Similar language is found in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919): "The most
stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic. It does not even protect a
man from an injunction against uttering words
that may have all the effect of force." Id. at 52.

cant is of good character and that the literature
to be distributed is free from fraud); Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)
(license tax on privilege of charging for newspaper advertising measured by gross receipts
therefrom); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)
(director of safety given power to refuse to issue
permits for public assembly upon his mere opinion
that such refusal would prevent riots, disturbances
or disorderly assemblage). See also Kunz v.
New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
21 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670-71
(1925).
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ity of prior restraint in motion picture
censorship. It does not purport to decide
whether the particular statute before it is
invalid on other grounds. It simply decides
that the Chicago ordinance need not fall
merely because it imposes a prior restraint.
The decision is described by the dissenting opinion as giving "official license to the
censor, approving a grant of power to city
officials to prevent the showing of any moving picture these officials deem unworthy
of a license. It thus gives formal sanction
to censorship in its purest and most farreaching form. .. -22 This remark is not
easily justified in light of the explicitly narrow issue adopted by the majority. Moreover, the majority opinion plainly states
"we, of course, are not holding that city
officials may be granted the power to prevent the showing of any motion picture they
' 23
deem unworthy of a license.
The Court, in addition, very clearly reserved for later determination questions involving the constitutional sufficiency of the
tests suggested by the Chicago ordinance,
and the constitutional consequences of its
24
operation in specific instances.
The severity and length of the dissenting
opinion, and its sweeping interpretation
of the majority view, might well engender
considerable misunderstanding. But let it
emphatically be pointed out that the decision, in fact, endorses the views expressed
in the Near case; viz., that free speech is
not a right completely unfettered, and,
more importantly, that prior restraint may
be imposed only under clearly exceptional

circumstances. 25 There is no indication that
those circumstances need be any less "exceptional" as a result of this decision. That
question was not considered.
Why the Court chose to confine its decision to an issue so narrow is a query well
disposed to speculation. As phrased by the
dissent, "surely, the Court is not bound by
the petitioner's conception of the issue or
by the more extreme positions that petitioner may have argued .... -2,Indeed, it
seems evident that the record, without difficulty, would have justified a contrary de27
cision on other grounds.
One possible answer might be that the
Court wished definitively to preserve in the
states at least theoretical power to exact a
prior censorship before it . undertook to
describe more precisely the limits thereof.
If this be the case, there is room to suggest
that those limits are to be broadened and
that the Times Film decision is but- a starting point in the process. The Court seemingly went to considerable lengths in
avoiding a clear opportunity to strike at the
most effective form of censorship. This appears to be indicative of its sympathies in
the area. Thus, while Times Film strictly
construed imparts nothing critically new, it
may well have sounded the key in which
subsequent decisions will be tuned.

Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 29 U.S.L.
WEEK 4120, 4126 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1961) (Warren.
C.J., dissenting).
23 I. at 4122.

26ld.

22

24

Ibid.

Expatriation
Citizenship is a right as precious and as
fundamental as the traditional freedoms of
speech, press and religion. It is, in a sense,
no less than the "right to have rights,"' and
251d. at 4121-22.
at 4126.
'7See cases cited note 20 supra.
1 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958). See
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64-65 (1958)
(dissenting opinion).

7
it can be attained by birth, or by compliance
with the rules for naturalization as laid down
by Congress. This latter proposition is
crystallized in the fourteenth amendment,
which provides that: "All persons born oi
naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein
they reside." '2 But unlike the more frequently
acknowledged freedoms which are constitutionally guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
there is no express constitutional protection
afforded to citizenship. Hence the basic
question arises as to the ways, if any, in
which this valuable right may be lost.
The recent case of Cort v. Herter3 dealt
with the constitutionality of Section 349 (a)
(10) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, which provides that:
(a) . . . a person who is a national of the

United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by (10) departing from or remaining outside
of the jurisdiction of the United States in
time of war or during a period declared by
the President to be a period of national
emergency for the purpose of evading or
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693
(1898), wherein the Supreme Court, in declaring
a child born in the United States of permanently
domiciled Chinese subjects to be a citizen, reached
the following conclusion: "The Fourteenth
Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental
rule of citizenship by birth within the territory,
in the allegiance and under the protection of the
country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications
(as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign
sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign
public ships, or of enemies within and during a
hostile occupation of part of our territory, and
with the single additional exception of children
of members of the Indian tribes owing direct
allegiance to their several tribes."
3 187 F. Supp. 683 (D.D.C. 1960), jurisdiction
noted, 21 U.S. SuP. CT. BULL. 566 (1961).
2
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avoiding training and service in the military,
4
air, or naval forces of the United States.

The petitioner was an American citizen by
birth, and he sought a judgment declaratory
of his right to United States citizenship. The
government based its claim of expatriation
on the alleged violation of the statute, and
met the burden of proof5 imposed on it
in such cases by presenting evidence
which convinced the Court of petitioner's
violation. 6
In addition to challenging the factual
basis of the alleged violation, the petitioner
also contended that Congress was "without
power to attach loss of citizenship as a
consequence of avoiding service in the
armed forces by remaining abroad," 7 arguing "that such an exercise of power would
violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution as well as the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments in the eighth
amendment."'8 At the threshold of the constitutional issue, the Court was confronted
with the United States Supreme Court case
of Trop v. Dulles,O where a similar statute'0
4 66 Stat. 163, 267-68 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481
(a)(10) (1958).
5"[W]hen a citizenship claimant proves his birth
in this country or acquisition of American citizenship in some other way, the burden is upon the
Government to prove an act that shows expatriation by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence." Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 133
(1958).
6 Cort v. Herter, 187 F. Supp. 683, 686 (D.D.C.
1960).
7Id. at 685.
8 Ibid.
) 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
10 In Trop v. Dulles, the prevailing opinion, in
an obiter dictum remark, drew an analogy between
the statutes decreeing loss of citizenship for
desertion in time of war, which it ultimately
declared unconstitutional, and the statute decreeing loss of citizenship for evading the draft by
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attaching loss of citizenship as a consequence of conviction for desertion in time
of war was declared unconstitutional as a
cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the eighth amendment." In striking down
Section 349(a) (10) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, the Court stated: "We
perceive no substantial difference between
the constitutional issue in the Trop case and
the one facing us. The Court's ruling there
is controlling here."' 12
At common law, the doctrine of perpetual allegiance prohibited voluntary expatriation without the consent of the
sovereign. 13 That such a doctrine was inconsistent with the policies of a young, growing America, which had thrown open its
shores to the immigrants of other lands,
scarcely needs demonstration. 14 But the
early courts of the United States were none
remaining abroad, calling the two "essentially"
alike. Id. at 93.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."
12 Cort v. Herter, supra note 6, at 687-88.
13 Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 150, 153
(1830). See also Inglis v. Sailor's-Snug Harbour,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 61, 75 (1830) (dictum);
McCampbell v. McCampbell, 13 F. Supp. 847,
848 (W.D. Ky. 1936).
14 Perhaps the most definitive statement of the
American position on the right of voluntary
expatriation appears in an opinion of Attorney
General Black:
"Here, in the United States, the thought of
giving it (the right of expatriation) up cannot
be entertained for a moment. Upon that principle this country was populated. We owe to
it our existence as a nation. Ever since our
independence we have upheld and maintained
it by every form of words and acts. We have
constantly promised full and complete protection to all persons who should come here and
seek it by renouncing their natural allegiance
and transferring their fealty to us. We stand
pledged to it in the face of the whole world."
9 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 356, 359 (1859).

too explicit in their pronouncements regarding the right of expatriation.', Thus, it
remained for Congress to permanently settle
the doubt surrounding the concept, when
in 1868 it passed legislation formally acknowledging the inherent right of voluntary
expatriation.16

Although this right was firmly established
by statute, 17 another and more serious question, namely, the power of Congress to
deprive an individual of citizenship, received
no such definitive answer. The existence of
this power does not seem to have been challenged in the courts prior to the case of
Mackenzie v. Hare,"'in which an American
citizen, who had married a British subject,
sought registration as a qualified voter. Her
application was denied on the ground that
marriage to a foreign citizen had deprived
15 See 3 MOORE,

INTERNATIONAL

(1906).
16 15 Stat. 223-24 (1868).
read as follows:

LAW

§ 431

Specifically, the act

"Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural
and inherent right of all people, indispensable
to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness; and whereas in
the recognition of this principle this government has freely received emigrants from all
nations, and invested them with the rights of
citizenship; and whereas it is claimed that such
American citizens, with their descendants, are
subjects of foreign states, owing allegiance to
the governments thereof; and whereas it is
necessary to the maintenance of public peace
that this claim of foreign allegiance should be
promptly and finally disavowed: Therefore, Be
it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That any declaration,

instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any
officers of this government which denies,
restricts, impairs, or questions the right of
expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent
with the fundamental principles of this
government."
17 Ibid.
1S 239 U.S. 299 (1915).

7
her of American citizenship by statute.' 9
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of
the statute, stating that although a "change
of citizenship cannot be arbitrarily imposed," the law in question dealt with "a
condition voluntarily entered into, with
notice of the consequences." 20 But the real
issue in the Mackenzie case was the power
of Congress to enact such legislation, and
despite mention of the voluntary aspect of
the conduct, the basis for the Court's decision was the government's sovereign power
to control foreign affairs. 21 In Savorgnan
v. United States, 22 a native-born American
woman had acquired Italian citizenship
while in the United States through naturalization in accordance with Italian law.
Forced to leave the country with her Italian
diplomat husband during the Second World
War, she sought to establish her American
citizenship upon her return. Although it
was clear that she had not intended to
jeopardize or surrender her American citizenship, the Supreme Court held that she
had expatriated herself by foreign naturalization. 23 The results in the Mackenzie and
19The statute provided that "any American
women who marries a foreigner shall take the
nationality of her -husband. At the termination
of the marital relation she may resume her
American citizenship.... ." 34 Stat. 1228-29
(1907). (Emphasis added.) Note that the statute
suspended citizenship rather than permanently
expatriated.
20
Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311-12
(1915).
21 Id. at 311. The Court made the following
remark: "As a government, the United States is
invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. As
it has the character'of nationality it has the powers
of nationality, especially those which concern its
relations and intercourse with other countries. We
should hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing such powers." Ibid. See also 14 MiCH. L. REV.
233-34 (1916).
2338 U.S. 491 (1950).
23 The controlling statutes in the Savorgnan case
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Savorgnan cases indicate that the Court did
not consider the power of Congress to
decree expatriation as dependent upon the
consent of the individual, but rather viewed
it as incident to the power to control foreign
24
affairs.
In 1958, the Supreme Court decided the
companion cases of Perez v. Brownell" and
Trop v. Dulles.26 They are significant not
only because they form the foundation for
an analysis of the Cort2 7 case, but also

because they evidence a serious divergence
of views as to the nature of the citizenship
right and the power of Congress to affect it.
In Perez v. Brownell, the petitioner was a
native-born American whose parents had
left with him for Mexico in 1920 before
he had attained majority. Aware of his
birthplace, he nonetheless remained in
Mexico during the Second World War for
the admitted purpose of avoiding the draft,
voting all the while in Mexican political
elections. Several years after the war, he
sought entrance to this country as a citizen.
It was denied on the ground that he had
expatriated himself. 28 Declining to pass on
were § 2 of the Citizenship Act, 34 Stat. 1228
(1907), and §§ 401, 403 of the Nationality Act,
54 Stat. 1168-70 (1940). In general the statutes
provided for expatriation as a consequence of
foreign naturalization, or taking an oath of
allegiance to a foreign country.
2i Note the following remark in Savorgnan v.
United States, 338 U.S. 491, 500 (1950): "The
United States has long recognized the general
undesirability of dual allegiances."
25356 U.S. 44 (1958).
26 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
27 187 F. Supp. 683 (D.D.C. 1960), jurisdiction
noted, 21 U.S. SuP. CT. BULL. 566 (1961).
28 The government denied entrance on the ground
that he had violated § 401 of the Nationality
Act, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a)
(5) (1958), which provided that: "A person who
is a national of the United States, whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by:
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the statute dealing with the avoidance of
military service, the Supreme Court held
that the power of Congress to regulate
foreign affairs included the power to prevent participation by citizens in foreign
political elections so as to avoid serious
international complications, and that the
withdrawal of citizenship was a means
29
reasonably calculated to achieve that end.

The dissent, 30 on the other hand, took the
position that the government was "without
power to take citizenship away from a
native-born or lawfully naturalized American," 31 and that only conduct unequivocally indicating a voluntary abandonment
of citizenship could be the basis of statutory
expatriation.' 2 The dissent concluded that
"the mere act of voting in a foreign election..., without regard to the circumstances
attending the participation, is not sufficient
(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign
state or participating in an election or
plebiscite to determine the sovereignty
over foreign territory .. "
A second ground was a later amendment which
decreed loss of nationality for:
"Departing from or remaining putside of
the jurisdiction of the United States in
time of war or during a period declared by
the President to be a period of national
emergency for the purpose of evading or
avoiding training and service in the land
or naval forces of the United States." 58
Stat. 746 (1944), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a)
(10) (1958).
29 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 59-62 (1958).
30 Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black and
Douglas.
31 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44,77 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
32 Id. at 75-76. The opinion stated that: "The
fatal defect in the statute before us is that its
application is not limited to those situations that
may rationally be said to constitute an abandonment of citizenship. . . . Congress has employed
a classification so broad that it encompasses conduct that fails to show a voluntary abandonment
of American citizenship." Id. at 76.

to show

a voluntary
3

abandonment

of

citizenship."
Trop v. Dulles34 dealt with a statute

that decreed expatriation as a consequence
of desertion, provided that the individual
was convicted by court-martial and dishonorably discharged. 3" The Supreme Court
held that the sanction imposed was penal
in nature, 36 and, as such, violated the prohibition in the eighth amendment against
cruel and unusual punishment. 3T Mr. Jus-

tice Brennan concurred in the result, but
on the ground that "the requisite rational
relation between this statute and the war
39
power does not appear .... "38 The dissent
reasoned that "Congress was calling upon
its war powers when it made such desertion
an act of expatriation,"' 40 and that attach-

ing denationalization to conduct already
unlawful did not make denationalization
41
a punishment.
The constitutionality of the statute in3 Id. at 78.
34 356 U.S. 86 (1958).

3"5Nationality Act, 54 Stat. 1168-69 (1940), as
amended, 58 Stat. 4 (1944), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a)
(8) (1958).
36Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Note the
following remark: "Plainly legislation prescribing
imprisonment for the crime of desertion is penal
in nature. If loss of citizenship is substituted for
imprisonment, it cannot fairly be said that the
use of this particular sanction transforms the
fundamental nature of the statute." Id. at 97.
3""It [expatriation] is a form of punishment more
primitive than torture, for it destroys for the
individual the political existence that was centuries in the development. The punishment strips
the citizen of his status in the national and international political community. His very existence
is at the sufferance of the country in which he
happens to find himself." Id. at 101.
3' Id. at 114 (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice
Brennan apparently adopted the Perez rule.
39 Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Clark and Harlan.
40
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 121 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
41

Id. at 124.

7
volved in the Cort case 42 was questioned
in three cases prior to the Trop decision.
In Gonzalez v. Landon,43 the Court declared that "citizenship is a matter of
voluntary choice," but that "a voluntary
act of a party which clearly indicates a
desire for and is declared by law to result
in expatriation is conclusive." ' 44 Apparently
ignoring its own statement, the Court held
Section 401(j), now Section 349 (a) (10),
of the Nationality Act constitutional without discussing whether evading military
service in time of war "clearly" indicated
a desire for expatriation. This decision was
followed without question by Vidales v.
irownell.45 The only other case in which
the issue arose was Mendoza-Martinez v.
Mackey,46 but because of the complicated
extraneous issues there involved, the government did not urge the constitutional
point so as to enable an adjudication of this
47
latter point that would be free from doubt.
The Cort case, then, is the first post-Trop
decision to pass on the constitutionality of
Section 349(a)(10), the former Section
401 (j), of the Nationality Act. As already
mentioned, the Court concluded that the
Trop case was controlling on the issue,
and declared the statute unconstitutional.
The statute in the Cort case was enacted
by Congress as part of the Nationality Act
of 1940, 4 8 though it was only added in
Cort v. Herter, supra note 27.
215 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1954), rev'd on other
grounds, 350 U.S. 920 (1955).
44 Id. at 956-57.
15 217 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1954).
46 238 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1956) (per curiam).
17 Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U.S. 384,
387 (1960)
(memorandum of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter).
4854 Stat. 1168 (1940). This act also made
treason, desertion in time of war, and forceful
overthrow of the government acts of "voluntary"
expatriation. The Expatriation Act, 68 Stat. 1146
12

43
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1944. Unlike the provisions involved in
the Mackenzie, Savorgnan and Perez cases,
many sections of the Nationality Act were
designed to punish internal criminal conduct rather than to regulate external foreign
affairs. 49 Thus, although it was effectively
argued in Perez that the attachment of
expatriation to certain conduct was reasonably calculated to effect congressional control of foreign relations, the same argument
is inapplicable to these "criminal" statutes.
It seems reasonably clear that these
"criminal" statutes are punishment in the
constitutional sense, 50 especially in view
of the fact that they generally require
conviction as a condition precedent to
expatriation. But the statute in the Cort
case is significantly different from these
other statutes at least in this important
aspect, since it does not require prior conviction in order to expatriate. The reason
for this apparent omission is that Congress
was attempting to deal with those individuals who were evading the draft, and
yet also remained outside the jurisdiction
of our courts, thus avoiding punishment.51
(1954), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (9) (1958), added
rebellion, insurrection, seditious conspiracy, and
violation of the Smith Act to this list of acts of
"voluntary" 'expatriation. See The Expatriation
Act of 1954, 64 YALE L. J. 1164 (1955).
49 See The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE
L. J. 1164, 1178 (1955).
50
o1d. at 1180.
Si "Certainly those who, having enjoyed the
advantages of living in the United States, were
unwilling to serve their country or subject themselves to the Selective Service Act, should be
penalized in some measure. This bill (Section
401 (j) ) would deprive such persons as are citizens of the United States of their citizenship, and,
in the case of aliens, would forever bar them
from admission into the United States. Any
American citizen who is convicted of violating
the Selective Service Act loses his citizenship.
This bill would merely impose a similar penalty
on those who are not subject to the jurisdiction
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A reading of the Congressional Record
leaves little doubt that section 401(j), now
section 349 (a) (10), was enacted to punish
such persons. 52 However, this conclusion
raises a question apparently not considered
by the Court in the Cort case, and one
which casts doubt as to the ground on
which the statute was declared unconstitutional. For if it be conceded that Congress
is attempting to punish by expatriation
those who remain outside the United States
to avoid military service, then it must
follow that the attempt to punish without
a prior conviction is a denial of due process
and violative of the fifth amendment. 53
Hence, the question of cruel and unusual
punishment is not reached, since the mere
"attempt" to punish without a determination of guilt is itself unconstitutional.
It can hardly be said that the question
of congressional power to decree loss of
citizenship is settled. The Perez and Trop
decisions indicate two competing views as
to the nature of the right, and congressional
power to affect it. The precarious balance
of power existing between these two
factions is highlighted by the fact that the
Trop decision required the concurring vote
of Mr. Justice Brennan to go the way it did,
and his opinion in restating the rule of
Perez provided no key to the ultimate disof our courts, the penalty being the same as would

result in the case of those who are subject to
the jurisdiction of our courts." See 90 CONG.
REC. 7629 (1944) (remarks of Senator Russell)
(emphasis added).
52 Ibid.
53 In the Trop case, the Supreme Court hinted
that § 401 (j) was a denial of due process, when
in an obiter dictum remark it stated that the
section did not provide "any semblance of procedural due process whereby the guilt of the draft
evader may be determined before the sanction
is imposed.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
94 (1958).

position of this question by the Court.
Perhaps a good deal of the confusion precipitated by this problem could be avoided
by keeping in mind the distinction between
the two types of statutes that have been
involved in these citizenship cases. In
Mackenzie, Savorgnan, and Perez the conduct was non-criminal, while in Trop and
Cort the statutes sought to punish wrongful
conduct. Failure to make this classification
might well account for the contention of
the dissent in Trop, i.e., that there was no
essential difference in the nature of the
sanctions imposed. The dissent apparently
was unwilling to recognize a difference
based on purpose and intent. But such
a classification cannot dispose of the more
fundamental question of c6ngressional
power to decree expatriation. As a general
proposition, the better view would seem to
be that Congress lacks such power and
that only conduct unequivocally indicating voluntary abandonment of citizenship
should be the basis of statutory expatriation. Such a conclusion is almost required
for equivocal, non-criminal conduct abroad,
for in such a case one can hardly reconcile
the arbitrary imposition of expatriation
with a Constitution dedicated to the preservation of fundamental rights and liberties.
And, as to criminal conduct, it would
seem that alternative penalties in the nature
of imprisonment, fine, or even death, can
be invoked by Congress, and made severe
enough to deter the potential offender without at the same time running afoul of the
eighth amendment. Finally, in this connection, it might be noted that certain criminal
conduct such as treason could, upon conviction, be made the basis of statutory
expatriation, not as additional punishment,
but simply as conduct unequivocally indicating an abandonment of citizenship.

7
Charitable Immunity
Recent years have witnessed the incessant but erratic erosion of the charitable
immunity doctrine.' This is of particular
importance to church organizations in view
of the fact that they may now be required
to divert a percentage of the charitable
fund toward the possibility of increased
litigation and insurance costs. But since
that which is so diverted will redress a tort
the diversion is morally justified.
Presently there are states in which
immunity no longer exists; 2 where it exists
in favor' of churches and other charitable
organizations but not in favor of hospitals;3
and where the immunity has remained
4
impervious. to attack.
In those states wherein the doctrine has
been rejected, the rejection has been bottomed on various factors. These range from
the observation that the "reason" for
' E.g., Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints
Hosp., 78 Idaho 60, 297 P.2d 1041 (1956); Parker
v. Port Huron Hosp., _ Mich. _, 105 N.W.2d
1 (1960); Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church,
27 N.J. 22,d41 A.2d 273 (1958); Foster v. Roman
Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230
(1950).

Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal.2d 356, 232 P.2d 241
(1951); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143
N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
3Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467,
135 N:E.2d 410 (1956); Gibbon v. YWCA, 170
Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960) (dictum).
4 Barrett v. Brooks Hosp., Inc., 338 Mass. 754,
157 N.E.2d 638 (1959). For recent surveys indicating the position of the various states on the
question of charitable immunity, see 4 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 180 (Spring 1958); Simeone, The Doc2

trine of CharitableImmunity, 5 ST. Louis U.L.J.
357, 369 (1959).

5 The theories upon which the charitable immunity doctrine has been based are: (a) the
Trust Fund theory, i.e., the use of funds for other
than charitable purposes would violate the
intended use of the contributions; (b) the Implied
Wiav''theory, i.e., those who accept charity
waive any claim against their benefactors; (c) the

CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER

1961

the immunity never did exist' to statements
that its elimination would not lead to any
undue hardship upon charitable institutions, especially when insurance is readily
available.7 Where the doctrine has been
retained, its retention has been defended
upon grounds of stare decisis.8
In the midst of these diametrically
opposed views lies the nebulous middle
area of partial immunity which assumes
a certain significance by reason of the fact
that it represents a transitional stage in
the trend toward non-immunity. This area
is exemplified by two recent decisions of
the Ohio Supreme Court, Gibbon v.
YWCA" and Blankenship v. Alter.10 In Gibbon the following question was certified:
"What is the present rule ... of Ohio with
reference to respondeat superior tort
liability or non-liability of a religious and
charitable institution (not a hospital) in
an action by a patron of such institution's
facilities."" The answer to this question was
a hesitant reaffirmance of the position that a
charitable institution is not liable for injury
theory that Respondeat Superior does not apply
where the activity is not conducted for profit; and
(d) that Public Policy dictates that charitable
institutions must be protected and tort recoveries
would discourage future contributors. See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 29.16 (1956).
6 Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n,
43 Wash.2d 162, 167, 260 P.2d 765, 768 (1953).
7 Bing v. Thunig, supra note 2, at 664, 143 N.E.
2d at 7, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
8 See Smith v. Congregation of St. Rose, 265
Wisc. 393, 398, 61 N.W.2d 896, -898 (1953).
"[Wie feel that it is for the legislature and not
this court to change the rule of immunity .... "
Ibid. See also Sister Ann Joachim, O.P., The
Policymakers: Courts or Legislatures?, 39 B.U.L.
REV. 349 (1959).
9 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960).
10 171 Ohio St. 65, 167 N.E.2d 922 (1960).
11 Gibbon v. YWCA, 170 Ohio St. 280, 284, 164
N.E.2d 563, 566 (1960).
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to a beneficiary of the institution, unless
such injury is caused through the failure of
the institution to exercise reasonable care in
the hiring or retaining of a negligent servant.
This ruling was followed by the Blankenship decision, wherein a participant at a
bingo game operated on church premises
recovered for injuries sustained when a
chair supplied by the church collapsed. The
Court reasoned that by engaging in an activity for profit the church lost whatever immunity it might have claimed - this, despite
12
the fact that the proceeds went to charity.
The combined effect of these decisions
in Ohio is to allow recovery against a
charitable institution only when the injury
is sustained by a stranger (a nonbeneficiary) or when the tort is committed in a
business activity.
In endeavoring to define the terms beneficiary and stranger, courts have produced
myriad results. Thus, a person who was
purchasing religious articles was held to
be a beneficiary, 13 while attendance at a
church social was held to present a factual
question as to plaintiff's status as a beneficiary.14 Further, spectators at a football
game were considered strangers, 15 while
patrons at a hillbilly show -were declared
beneficiaries.1 6 In some areas, charities have
been held liable to paying beneficiaries;' 7
Blankenship v. Alter, 171 Ohio St. 65, 167
N.E.2d 922 (1960).
13 Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E.2d
146 (1942).
14 Jewell v. St. Peter's Parish, 10 N.J. Super. 229,
76 A.2d 917 (1950).
'5 Clayton v. Southern Methodist Univ.,
172
S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), rev'd on
other grounds, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749
(1944).
16 Esposito v. Henry H. Stambaugh Auditorium
Ass'n, 77 N.E.2d 111 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
17 Executive Comm. v. Ferguson, 95 Ga. App.
393, 400, 98 S.E.2d 50, 56 (1957).
12

in others no distinction is made between
paying and nonpaying beneficiaries.I s
The attempt to define charitable as
opposed to business activities has also led
to contrary results. Hence the practice of
letting rooms has been defined as a business activity, 19 though providing shelter
for animals under a contract agreement
is considered a charitable function. 20 Some
courts have held that the conduct of a
store is a commercial activity, 21 while
others have indicated that the nature of
the activity may not matter so long as the
proceeds go to charity. 2 2

...

The distinctions thus drawn by courts
in their attempt to identify beneficiaries
and charitable activities seem analogous
to decisions which had imposed liability
for the negligent administrative acts of
charitable hospitals, but not for negligent
medical acts. As a result, courts indulged
in petty distinctions which required the
imposition of liability where blood was
administered to the wrong patient, 23 but
not where the wrong blood was administered to the right patient. 24 These distinctions were finally rejected in New York
because they provided for "neither guiding principles nor clear delineation of
18 Williams v. Randolph Hosp., Inc., 237 N.C.
387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953).
19 Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese, 301 S.W.2d
574 (Ky. 1953).
20Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League, 353 Pa.
408, 412, 45 A.2d 59,63 (1946).
21 Berube v. Salvation Army, Inc., 21 Conn. Supp.
487, 157 A.2d 493 (Super. Ct. 1960).
22 Esposito v. Henry H. Stambaugh Auditorium
Ass'n, supra note 16, at 112 (dictum).
29 Necolayff v. Genesee Hosp., 296 N.Y. 936,
73 N.E.2d 117 (1947) (per curiam).
24 Berg v. New York Soc'y for the Relief of
the Ruptured & Crippled, 1 N.Y.2d 499, 136
N.E.2d 523, 154 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1956).

7
policy .... ,,25 The same criticism may

properly be leveled at the Gibbon and
Blankenship decisions.
The Ohio court, after having rejected
the doctrine of charitable immunity with
regard to hospitals, 26 has chosen to retain
it in the case of charitable institutions
where the injury is to a beneficiary or does
not occur in a business activity. The reason
for this does not hinge on a reactionary
tendency on the part of the court but may
rather lie in the statement that the "revision
of an established policy should be made
only when compelling reasons are set
forth... " 27 Such compelling reasons were
28
not set before the court in either case.
It is also probable that the course of legislative action in Ohio may have affected
29
its decision.
The Ohio position with regard to charitable immunity, however, is not unique.
Courts do not, as a rule, make the transition from nonliability to total liability in
one leap. The normal process which follows
the adoption of the immunity doctrine
entails a constant imposition of exceptions
until the immunity ceases to exist.30 In this
25

Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 661, 143 N.E.2d

3, 5, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 6 (1957).
26

Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467,
135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
2 Gibbon v. YWCA, 170 Ohio St. 280, 288,
164 N.E.2d 563, 569 (1960).
28 In Gibbon, the petition alleged that plaintiff
had drowned through the negligence of the
defendant but the facts were insufficient and did
not support the allegations of negligence. In
Blankenship, the plaintiffs asked for relief which
came within the partial immunity rule set out
in Gibbon.
29 The Governor of Ohio has recently vetoed a
bill which would have codified the rule set forth
in Gibbon and the court may have decided to
await the outcome of the legislative process. See
Gibbon v. YWCA, 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d
563 (1960).
30 A state which recently followed this process
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light, the Gibbon and Blankenship decisions
would seem to be but a pause in the
decisional process inclined toward nonimmunity.
"Charity suffereth long and is kind, but
in the common law it cannot be careless.
When it is, it ceases to be kindness and
becomes actionable wrongdoing."'' a To
deny an individual compensation because
he suffered injury at the hands of a charitable organization is "to require him to
make an unreasonable contribution to
-32
the. charity ....
Deportation
Since the Garden of Eden, banishment
or exclusion has long been a social lever
imposed as punishment for wrongs committed against the justice, modesty, and
peace of the social compact. In Rome,
banishment came to be punishment for
adultery, murder, poisoning, forgery, embezzlement, sacrileges and various other
crimes which today are termed crimes of
moral turpitude.'
The United States provided for banishment in 1798 when it enacted the Alien
and Sedition Laws, which gave to the
President the power to rid the nation of
those dangerous to its peace and safety.
The present exclusion law applying to

was New Jersey. The doctrine was adopted in
D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hosp., 101 N.J.L.
61, 127 AtI. 340 (1925), was qualified in Simmons
v. Wiley Methodist Episcopal Church, 112 N.J.L.
129, 170 Atd. 237 (1934), and totally rejected
in Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary,
27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958). But see N.J.
STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, §§ 53A-7, 8 (Supp. 1960).
31 President and Directors of Georgetown College
v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
32
HARPER, TORTS § 294, at 657 (1933).
1 Navasky, Deportationas Punishment, 27 U.KAN.
CrrY L. REV. 213, 219 (1959).
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aliens was created in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. This section provides, inter alia:
(a) An alien in the United States (including
an alien crewman) shall, upon the order of
the Attorney General, be deported who
(4) is convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude committed within five years after
entry and either sentenced to confinement
or confined therefor in a prison or corrective
institution, for a year or more or who at any
time after entry is convicted of two crimes
involving moral turpitude, not arising out
of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,
regardless of whether confined therefor and
regardless of whether the convictions were
in a single trial .... 2
One of the most evasive and difficult
elements to establish in such a proceeding
is whether the crime committed is one involving "moral turpitude." Two schools of
thought exist in the area: one believes that
the term "moral turpitude" is vague and
indefinite, 3 and the other maintains that
4
it is well defined and easily understood.
In the recent case of United States ex rel.
Sollazzo v. Esperdy,5 the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York has expanded the specific list of
crimes involving turpitude to include the
crime of bribing a participant in an amateur game, stating: "The corrupt intent
together with the element of fraud necessarily present in crimes under the genus
'bribery' leaves no room for doubt and

compels the conclusion that the crime of
bribery of a participant in an amateur game
involves moral turpitude." 6
The concept of "moral turpitude" is several centuries old and does have a positive
meaning, although it has never been clearly
or certainly defined. 7 All crimes embraced
within the Roman conception of the
"'crimen falsi" involve moral turpitude,
some elements of which are baseness, vileness, or depravity. 8 It is generally agreed
that infamous offenses, crimes mala in se,
and felonies are three types of offenses involving moral turpitude. 9 However, difficulty arises where a court faced with a
specific crime and a "real" defendant must
determine whether the particular crime fits
within the nebulous bounds of "moral turpitude." It has been said that one reason
for the difficulty is that turpitude itself is
measured by moral standards which society has set up for itself through the
centuries. 10 Standards change; hence turpitude varies according to the contemporaneous community mores. If the crime is not
one patently contrary to all moral standards, who shall determine what standards
are applicable? With what degree of certanty can they be ascertained?
In addition to the difficulty in applying
the concept "moral turpitude" itself, there
is also a conflict in the courts as to the
proper scope of inquiry into the question of
whether a prior conviction was for a crime
involving moral turpitude. One view is to
61d. at

2 8 U.S.C. §1251(a) (4)(1958) (emphasis added).
3 United States ex rel. Berlandi v.Reimer, 30 F.

Supp. 767, 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d
429 (2d Cir. 1940).
4 Bartos v.United States Dist. Court for Dist. of
Neb., 19 F.2d 722, 727 (8th Cir. 1927) (concurring opinion).
5 187 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).

7

756.

See United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmer-

man, 71 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
8 Holloway v. Holloway, 126 Ga. 459, 55 S.E.
191 (1906).
9 See Bartos v. United States Dist. Court for Dist.
of Neb., supra note 4, at 725.
10 United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman,
supra note 7, at 537.

7
consider only the inherent nature of the
transgression itself rather than the surrounding circumstances." The other would
examine circumstances extraneous to the
crime itself in making a determination concerning deportation. For example, larceny,
no matter, how small or insignificant, has
been considered a crime involving moral
turpitude. 12 But in Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 13 the defendant who, in 1914, at the
age of seventeen, had been convicted of
petty larceny, was held by a 1958 court
not to have committed a crime involving
moral turpitude. The court, applying the
modern attitude toward juvenile crime,
stated that "to hold [petty larceny as moral
turpitude in this case] would flout the
decent and modern standards for dealing
with youthful offenders .
,4 As this case
"...
indicates, the confines to which "moral
turpitude" will be limited must be left to
a judicial process that will expand and
contract to meet the changing standards
of society.
Such an approach is open to the criticism that it is too elastic, and leaves too
much to the discretion of the courts. In
Tillinghast v. Edmead,15 a petty larceny by
an "ignorant colored domestic" was considered an act of moral turpitude. Yet a
minor's possession of burglar tools with an
intent to commit the crime of larceny
was held not to be such an act. 16 In United
States ex rel. Mazzillo v. Day, 7 an assault
11 United States ex rel. Mongiovi v. Karnuth, 30

F.2d 825 (W.D.N.Y.1929).
Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81 (lst Cir.
1929).

12

13
14

160 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Id. at 436.

15 Tillinghast v. Edmead, supra note 12.
.16 United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d

399 (2d Cir. 1939).
IT

15 F.2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
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by an intoxicated person was held to constitute moral turpitude, but in Manzella v.
Zimmerman, 8 jail breaking without the
element of violence was not. The intentional taking of human life without justification is a crime involving turpitude.' 9 This
classification includes manslaughter in the
21
first degree. 20 Second degree manslaughter
and homicide resulting from negligent operation of a motor vehicle, 22 however, no
matter how negligent, are not considered
crimes of moral turpitude. Assault with
intent to kill 28 or rob, 24 or assault with a
dangerous weapon2 5 all involve moral
turpitude, but aggravated assault 26 does
not indicate it conclusively. As to the
latter, the court must weigh all the circumstances disclosed by the record, and
determine whether a particular aggravated
assault involves moral turpitude. 27 Assault
and battery in and of itself will not constitute moral turpitude. 28 This is an exception to the common-law rule that mala in se
crimes always involved turpitude. Fraud
has been held both in federal and state
courts to involve moral turpitude, even
Is United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman,
71 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
19 Pillisz v. Smith, 46 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1931).
20 United States ex rel. Allesio v. Day, 42 F.2d
217 (2d Cir. 1930).
21 United States ex rel. Mongiovi v. Karnuth, 30
F.2d 825 (W.D.N.Y. 1929).
22 In re Schiano Di Cola, 7 F. Supp. 194 (D.R.I.
1934).
23 United States ex rel. Shladzien v. Warden of E.
State Penitentiary, 45 F.2d 204 (E.D. Pa. 1930).
24 See United States ex rel. Rizzio v. Kenney, 50
F.2d 418 (D. Conn. 1931).
25 United States ex rel. Morlacci v. Smith, 8 F.2d
663 (W.D.N.Y. 1925).
26 United States ex rel. Griffo v. McCandless, 28
F.2d 287 (E.D. Pa. 1928).
27 Ibid.
28 Ciambelli ex rel. Maranci v. Johnson, 12 F.2d

465 (D. Mass. 1926).
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without the ingredient of 1OSS;29 so also,
perjury30 having fraud as its foundation,
and bigamy. 31 Conviction of crime which by
definition does not necessarily involve moral
turpitude is not ground for deportation
merely because the alien acted immorally
as well. 32 Conversely, when the crime
involves moral turpitude, no evidence other
than the record can be introduced to show
83
that the defendent was in fact, blameless.
In Forbes v. Brownell,34 the plaintiff was
excluded from the United States on the
grounds that he had committed and been
convicted of bigamy. The question of intent
was raised by the alien. He contended that
in the absence of mens rea, moral turpitude
was not involved under the Canadian
statute. The court agreed, since his conviction under the Canadian law was based
upon an honest mistake in remarrying; in
effect, no intent, no turpitude.
35
In 1924, the District Court of Maine
classified extortion, bribery, and conspiracy
to extort from a public official as crimes
involving moral turpitude. Although the
concept of bribery has been legislatively
expanded to include other than public officials, the gist of the crime has remained
the same, viz., the corruption of one having
a legal, moral, or public duty. In view of
this, the decision in United States ex rel.

E.g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951);
Bisaillon v. Hogan, 257 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1958).
30 United States ex rel. Boraca v. Schlotfeld, 109
F.2d 106 (7th Cir. 1940).
31 Gonzalez-Martinez v. Landon, 203 F.2d 196
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 998 (1953).
32 United States ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d
1022 (2d Cir. 1931).
33 United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.
Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
34 149 F.Supp. 848 (D.D.C. 1957).
35 Ex parte Tozier, 2 F.2d 268 (1924), aff'd sub
non., Howes v. Tozer, 3 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1925).
29

Sollazzo v. Esperdy,36 holding that the
crime of bribery of a participant in an
amateur game involves moral turpitude, is
not surprising.
The concept of "crime involving moral
turpitude," although lacking in legal precision, has been held sufficiently definite
to be a constitutional standard for deportation. 37 Aliens are punished under this
elastic and indefinite phrase, with a life
sentence of banishment, in addition to the
punishment which a citizen would suffer
for the same act. There is no doubt that the
provisions of section 1251 (a) (4) are of
a harsh penal character, designed to exclude
the hardened, confirmed criminal rather
than the occasional ignorant or bewildered
alien offender. Under the present wording
of the statute, the enforcement of a severe
penal sanction is made to depend upon the
construction of a notoriously vague and
shifting concept. Although the phrase is
indeed a venerable one, the outer limits
of which have been broadly delineated by
much judicial construction, there has been
much disagreement, and, in view of the
sanctions involved, it would seem that a
far more definitive standard is both necessary and equitable.
Such a standard could be established by
more definitive legislation. Such legislation
might take the form of a precise definition
of the phrase "moral turpitude." The difficulty here, aside from the problems inherent
in legally defining a moral concept, is in
adopting a definition reasonably related to
objectivity and yet flexible enough to allow
for changing conditions and shifting moral
temperaments of the legislature, the judiciary, and the people.
36

187 F.Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).

37 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
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A more practical approach might be the
abandonment of the phrase in question
altogether and the substitution of a detailed
list of the actual crimes necessary to effect
banishment. The requisite flexibility of such
an approach would, of course, be provided by subsequent legislative amendments

including or excluding crimes. This identical method has proved both feasible and
practical in other similar areas, notably
8
that of international extradition treaties.a

ANTE-NUPTIAL PROMISES

ought require that the othei party assume
the burden of showing that the agreed religious upbringing no longer would be in
the best interests of the child. Sound judicial
discretion can then evaluate this difficult
situation in which wholly doctrinaire approaches and artificial standards can but
prove inadequate.

(Continued)
ment to be hostile to religion and to throw
its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence. ' 74 Man
and woman have freely exchanged solemn
promises which by their very substance
demonstrate their seriousness. The state in
assuming its role as arbitor of domestic
controversy ought not lightly regard such
promises. When one parent seeks to enforce
the agreement, the writer feels the court

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
Concerning permissible monetary aids to religion
see U. S. CONST., amend. 1, 763-64 (Corwin rev.
F4

ed. 1952).

38 See United States v. Raucher, 119 U.S. 407
(1886).

It happens that the respondent seeking
herein the protection of the right to the
exercise of religious freedom contained in
the ante-nuptial contract is a Catholic. But
the principle invoked operates to bulwark
the right to the exercise of religious freedom
of persons of all religions, for its applica75
tion extends to all.
75 Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100, 112 (Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1942).

